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SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN NEW YORK
STATUTORY LAW: A ROADMAP FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
In November 1975, New York voters failed to ratify a state

equal rights amendment (ERA)' that would have guaranteed men
and women the equal protection of the laws by prohibiting the
State's use of sex as a basis for legal classifications.2 Perhaps the
single most important factor contributing to the ERA's defeat was
the public's misunderstanding of the practical impact of such a
sweeping constitutional amendment.3 Electoral defeat, therefore,
should not be viewed as an unqualified endorsement of New York's
existing statutory law. Since much of this legislation is premised on
anachronistic sexual stereotypes,4 eradication of sex discrimination
continues to be a necessary legislative objective.5
'The proposed ERA was initially approved by the legislature in 1974. N.Y.A. 9030-A,
197th Sess. (1974). The electorate, however, defeated its ratification by a vote of 1,774,885 to
1,363,831. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, at 33, col. 5.
2 The proposed amendment stated: "§ 13. Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the state "ofNew York or any subdivision thereof on account of sex."
For general discussions on sex discrimination in the law and the merits of an equal rights
amendment, see K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 108-16
(1974) [hereinafter cited as DAVIDSON]; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The EqualRights
Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
Thus far, 15 states have passed their own equal rights amendments: Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. 1 WOMEN'S L. REP. 1.63 (1974).
' Anti-ERA forces charged that the ERA would allow homosexual marriage, force
women to contribute '2 the costs of raising a family, abolish the right to seek alimony, and
require coed toilet facilities. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
4 As recently as 1961, the United States Supreme Court, in upholding a rule exempting
women from jury duty, stated:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly
considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life.
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961). This view of women was discarded by the Court,
however, in 1975 when, upon reconsideration of the automatic exemption of women from
jury service, it concluded that there was no rational basis for this sex-based exemption.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535-37 (1975). See generally L. KANOWITz, WOMEN AND
THE LAw: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969).
Indeed, annual statistics compiled by the Department of Labor indicate that as of 1974
women constituted 45.7% of the entire labor force. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP"T
OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, Nov. 1975, Vol. 22, No. 5, at 18.
1 In 1972, prior to the proposal of the state ERA, the New York State Law Revision
Commission began a study of discriminatory New York statutes that would require modification upon passage of the Federal ERA. The Commission has approved a legislative package,
proposing numerous reforms of these laws, to be presented to the New York Legislature in
1976. Telephone interview with Ms. Joyce Pulliam, N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, Oct.
21, 1975.
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This Note will offer a broad overview of the nature and scope
of sex discrimination in New York's statutory law. It is submitted
that, given the commitment of the legislature to adapt the law to
modern social needs, the task of reforming these laws should be
pursued, notwithstanding the defeat of the ERA. Absence of a
specific constitutional command should not deter an affirmative
and comprehensive program of legislative reform.
SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATIVE TASK

Approaches Available
The statutory provisions authorizing different treatment of
persons because of their sex are many and diverse. 6 The legislature
has several options available to rectify these sexually discriminatory
laws. To accord both sexes the equal protection of the laws, a
statute's application can be extended to members of the previously
excluded sex. 7 Alternatively, the discriminatory provision can be
repealed altogether. 8
For discussions of the impact of federal and state ERA's on the laws of individual states,
ERA CONFORMANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE CALIFORNIA STATE CODES (1975) (Equal Rights Amendment Project); Dybwad, Implementing Washington's ERA: Problems with Wholesak Legislative Revision, 49 WASH. L. REV. 571 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Dybwad]; Uda, Equalityfor Men and Women, Three Approaches: Frontiero,
the Equal Rights Amendment and the Montana Equal Dignities Provision, 35 MONT. L. REV. 325
(1974).
1 A computer survey of New York statutes revealed more than 250 provisions containing sex-based references. See N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, Preliminary Staff Worksheet
on N.Y. Statutes Found to Have Sex-Based Distinctions (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comm'n
Worksheet]. These provisions appear in nearly every statutory code. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (alimony available only for former wife); N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW § 9-1303(12) (McKinney 1973) (Department may incur expenses
for training of men outside of state); N.Y. TRANSP. LAw § 103(3) (McKinney 1975) (free
transportation for widows of deceased common carrier employees).
Extending application of a statute to that sex previously excluded can be simply
achieved through "neuterization" of the provision in question. For example, "husband" and
"wife" can be replaced by "spouse," "boy" and "girl" can be replaced by "minor," and "male"
and "female" can be replaced by "person." See, e.g., ch. 351, § 3, [1972] N.Y. Laws 1590,
amending ch. 575, § 2, [1953] N.Y. Laws 1357 (codified at N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3228 (McKinney
Supp. 1975))" (references to boys deleted from enumerated qualifications of newspaper
carriers); ch. 377, § 10, [1973] N.Y. Laws 1331, amending ch. 783, § 2 [1963] N.Y. Laws 2603
(codified at N.Y. LABOR LAw §§ 172, 173 (McKinney Supp. 1975)) (references to minors
substituted for references to boys and girls in maximum work hour provisions).
The judiciary has at times adopted such an approach. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (social security benefits extended to widowers); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (benefits extended to servicewomen). See generally DAVIDSON, supra note 2, at 94-99.
'See, e.g., ch. 377, § 11, [1973] N.Y. Laws 1336, repealing ch. 783, § 2, [1963] N.Y. Laws
2601; ch. 377, § 14, [1973] N.Y. Laws 1337, repealing ch. 582, § 4, [1962] N.Y. Laws 2817.
This labor legislation had accorded women special protection.
The courts have on occasion also invalidated statutory provisions found to be discriminatory. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (provision exempting women
see CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
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Also available to the legislature is a third avenue of reform: a
statutory classification can be restructured on individualized
criteria that focus not on a person's sex but on his or her responsibilities and capabilities. Such an approach was employed by the
legislature in its recent amendment to the jury exemption rule.
Responding to the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of
Louisiana's automatic exemption of all women from jury service, 9
the New York Legislature amended the State's jury selection statute1 ° to provide for the exemption of any person whose primary
responsibility during the day is child care. 1 Thus worded, the
statute not only avoids creating discriminatory classifications on the
basis of sex, but also more precisely reaches the class of persons
intended to benefit by this exemption.
Extent of Existing Discriminatory Provisions

The task of eradicating sex discrimination from New York law
is not as overwhelming as it might first appear. Initially, it should
be noted that, over the years, the legislature has responded to the
changing status of women by eliminating many discriminatory provisions.1 2 In addition, numerous affirmative legislative steps have
been taken to ensure women equal treatment in school admissions,' 3 credit' 4 and insurance' 5 practices, employment opportunities,' 6 and wage policies. 7
from jury service); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (probate code provision giving men
preference over women in the administration of estates); In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286
N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972) (family court provision according special treatment to
minor females).
In jurisdictions which have sought to eradicate sex discrimination from the law, a
pattern of legislative response has emerged. Generally, once a statute accords one sex a
benefit, its application is extended to the other sex. Conversely, if the statute imposes a
burden on one sex, it is most often withdrawn. See generally 1 WOMEN'S L. REP. 1.64 (1974).
' Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
10 Ch. 382, [1975] N.Y. Laws 547 (McKinney), amending ch. 864, § 2, [1955] N.Y. Laws
204(9); ch. 202, § 1, [1940] N.Y. Laws 773; ch. 305, § 1, [1954] N.Y. Laws 945 (codified at
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §§ 507(7), 599(7), 665(7) (McKinney Supp. 1975)).
11N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §§ 507(7), 599(7), 665(7) (McKinney Supp. 1975) all exempt
0
from jury service
[a] . . . person who resides in the same household with a child or children under
sixteen years of age, and whose principal responsibility is to actually and personally
engage in the daily care and supervision of such child or children during a majority
of the hours between eight a.m. and six p.m .....
12See, e.g., ch. 66, §§ 1-2, [1973] N.Y. Laws 730, amending ch. 326, § 1, [1965] N.Y. Laws
1065 (codified at N.Y. CIVIL SERV. LAW § 58 (McKinney Supp. 1975)) (requirement that
police officer be male deleted); statutes cited note 8 supra.
13 Gh. 275, § 1, [1972] N.Y. Laws 1290 (codified at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3201-a (McKinney
Supp. 1975)) (sex discrimination in school admissions and athletic programs prohibited).
14 Ch. 173, § 6, [1974] N.Y. Laws 873 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a (McKinney
Supp. 1975)) (sex discrimination in the extension of credit prohibited).
15 Ch. 564, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 823 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. INS. LAW § 40-e
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Of those statutes that still authorize sex discrimination, many
require only the slightest legislative attention. One such group
pertains to institutions and persons that no longer exist or procedures no longer practiced. 18 Such obsolete legislation could easily
be repealed as part of the legislature's routine housekeeping function. Another group of statutes requires the deletion of objectionable language which reflects traditional sexual stereotypes.' 9 While
"male persons" fight fires 20 and practice law, 2 ' "matrons" supervise
children.2 2 Simple neuterization would reflect the fact that today
both sexes fill or are capable of filling these jobs. A third category
of statutes requiring minor, if any, legislative attention are those
related to the right of privacy. 23 For example, even under the ERA,
it is generally agreed that statutes requiring separate hygiene
facilities for each sex 2 4 would have remained constitutionally
valid, 5 so long as adequate accommodations are available to both
sexes.
(McKinney Supp. 1975)) (sex discrimination in the issuance or renewal of insurance policies
prohibited).
" Ch. 516, § 1, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1419 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney
Supp. 1975)) (unlawful employment practice includes sex discrimination); ch. 239, § 1,
[1964] N.Y. Laws 1034 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975))
(freedom from sex discrimination in employment a civil right).
17 Ch. 548, § 2, [1966] N.Y. Laws 1296 (codified at N.Y. LABOR LAW § 194 (McKinney
Supp. 1975)) (equal pay for equal work guaranteed).
1
8See, e.g., N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 310-11 (McKinney 1968) (commitment of young
females found in houses of prostitution to charitable institutions); id. §§ 472(l)-(2), 473
(special benefits to widows of prison employees hired before 1925); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§
1771-74 (McKinney 1949) (commitment of wayward females to state institution that no
longer exists). For a more extensive list of statutes dealing with institutions that no longer
exist and procedures no longer practiced, see Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, at A-1, -2,
-6.

N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712(b) (McKinney 1963), defining "Persons in Need of Supervision" (PINS) as males under 16 and females under 18 has yet to be amended despite the
court of appeals' decision that the portion of the statute applicable to females between 16
and 18 is unconstitutional. See In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1972). For an extensive list, see Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, at A-3, -6. None of the
numerous bills proposing amendment to PINS provisions, e.g., N.Y.S. 5302, N.Y.A. 8451,
198th Sess. (1975); N.Y.S. 5547, N.Y.A. 8135, 198th Sess. (1975), have been passed.
19 Despite the normal rule of legislative draftsmanship that dictates the use of male
pronouns, nurses are typically referred to by the use of female pronouns. Compare N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 356(2)(b), 2560(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975) with id. §§ 203, 208 (McKinney
1971).
Other sexual references appear at N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW § 9-0101(3)
(McKinney 1973) (fire patrolmen are "able-bodied males"), id. § 11-0515(1) ("seientific
men"), and N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1410(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975) ("business
men"). For a more extensive list, see Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, sec. D.
20 N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW §§ 9-1111, -1115 (McKinney 1973).
1
See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 472 (McKinney 1968).
22 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 18-b(4) (McKinney 1968); N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 121-b(4)
(McKinney
1965).
2
3 See generally Brown, supra note 2, at 900-02.
24
See, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 293, 378, 381(1) (McKinney 1965) (women employees in
certain
establishments must have separate hygiene facilities).
2
5E.g., Brown, supra note 2, at 900-02.
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A fourth and final category of statutes not requiring undue
legislative concern is that consisting of discriminatory statutes
which either do not affect fundamental rights or are of limited
application. Some of these impose special obligations on males
only. Male employees of liquor manufacturers, for example, must
be registered with and their fingerprints submitted to the State
28
Liquor Authority. 26 Men must aid sheriffs, 2 7 attorney generals,
and environmental officers2 9 in the performance of their duties.
3°
Few affirmative duties, by comparison, are imposed on women,
and yet, as a class, they do enjoy numerous benefits. 3 ' Women are
exempt from civil arrest 32 and are entitled to the exemption of
certain real 33 and personal3 4 property from the satisfaction of a
money judgment. In actions alleging the slanderous imputation of
unchastity, they need not prove special damages, 3 5 and, if employed in factories, they are entitled to seats 36 and pure drinking
water. 3 7 These statutes, as those that impose burdens on men, can
either be extended to apply to members of both sexes or repealed
altogether, depending on the continued utility of the individual
provision.
Legislators face a more difficult task when reforming laws that
employ sex-based classifications in the delineation of more funda26 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW §§ 103(6), 104(9) (McKinney 1970).
27 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 400 (McKinney 1968).
25 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1972).

29 N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW § 9-1111 (McKinney 1973).
30See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2308, 4136 (McKinney 1971) (women must be
examined for venereal disease during pregnancy). Given the state's interest in the well-being
of its citizens and the fact that pregnancy is a unique physical characteristic, this provision
should not be considered objectionable.
31 For example, women, but not men, are entitled to seek alimony upon the dissolution
of a marriage. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See notes 57-58 and
accompanying text infra. When a physical examination is required by her employer, a
woman is entitled to have either a female physician perform the examination or have
another female present when the examination is performed by a male. N.Y. LABOR LAW
§ 206-a (McKinney 1965).
31 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 6101(1) (McKinney 1963). But see Repetti v. Gill, 174 N.Y.L.J.
44, Sept. 2, 1975, at 8, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County) (exemption unconstitutional); Gould
v. Gould, 82 Misc. 2d 835, 371 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975) (exemption
unconstitutional); cf. Bon-R Reprods., Inc. v. Gift Mate, Ltd., 81 Misc. 2d 630, 365 N.Y.S.2d
645 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (court refused to pass on exemption's constitutionality).
33 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5206(a), (e) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (exemption for woman's
homestead not exceeding $2000 in value).
34
Id. § 5205(a) (McKinney 1963) (exemption for woman's personal property including
clothing and household effects).
3 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 77 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
36
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 203-b (McKinney 1965).
37
Id. § 377. Although most protectionist statutory provisions of this type were repealed
in 1973, see note 8 and accompanying text supra, a number still remain. See Comm'n
Worksheet, supra note 6, at A-3, -4.
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mental or socially important rights and responsibilities. In these
areas, where eradication of sex discrimination cannot be effected
through simple equalization of a statute's application to include
members of both sexes, it is suggested that legislators should consider adopting new classifications based on individual needs and
capabilities. Statutes requiring such special legislative concern are
those which involve the family, sex-plus-age discrimination, survivor's benefits, and unique physical characteristics.
FAMILY LAW

Laws governing the family have traditionally been premised on
sexual stereotypes of women as "homemakers" and "childrearers"
and men as "breadwinners." 38 Accordingly, many of the statutes in
this area are overly protective of women and impose substantial
burdens on men.3 9 It is urged that New York seriously consider
following the lead of a growing number of states that have adopted
functionally based classifications to replace traditional sex-based
40
provisions.
Support and Alimony
Under present law, a husband is required to support his
wife, 4 1 which includes the duty to furnish her with all requirements
necessary for her existence and maintenance. 4 2 Her financial need,
"For

general discussions on the traditional vidw of the marital relationship, see H.

CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1968) [hereinafter cited as

CLARK]; DAVIDSON, supra note 2, at 117-73; Brown, supra note 2, at 936-54; R. LEVY,
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1969) [herein-

after cited as LEVY]; Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York: Partnership of
Co-Equals?, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 169 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed].
35
See notes 44-60 and accompanying text infra.
40 Coinciding with the passage of its own ERA, TEx. CONST. art. 1 § 3a, the Texas
Legislature recently enacted a new family code. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. (1975). Se' Raggio &
Rasor, From Dream to Reality-How to Get a New Code on the Books, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 105 (1974);
Sampson, The Texas Equal Rights Amendment and the Family Code: Litigation Ahead, 5 TEXAS
TECH U.L. REV. 631 (1974). Similarly, Virginia enacted a major revision of its marriage and
dissolution laws in 1975. Ch. 644, [1975] Va. Acts 1336.
For discussion of the anticipated effect of an ERA on state family laws, see Gabler, The
Impact of the ERA on Domestic Relations Law: Specific Focus on California, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 51
(1974); Comment, Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania, 77 DICK. L.
REV. 254 (1973); 3 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 312 (1973).
41 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 32(1) (McKinney 1964); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 412 (McKinney 1963). See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (McKinney Supp. 1975). The husband is
presumed to have sufficient means to support his wife. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 437 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Normally, a support order will not be issued while the spouses are living
together, however, on the theory that the courts should not interfere with a family's financial
arrangements. Foster & Freed, supra note 38, at 182.
42 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 416 (McKinney Supp. 1974) outlines the elements of support
as including "necessary shelter, food, clothing, care, medical attention, expenses of confine-
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however, is not the sole criterion upon which the support obligation is measured. The necessaries to which she is entitled are
determined according to her spouse's station in life,4 3 taking into
consideration his potential as well as actual earnings.4 4
A man is also charged with the primary obligation for the
support of his child.4 5 Here too, the measure of support generally
looks to the child's needs relative to the father's financial
capabilities; 46 the resources of the mother and the child are irrelevant. 47 Neither divorce nor the mother's subsequent remarriage
relieve a father of this responsibility 4 8 which continues until the
49
child is 21.
Under the existing statutory scheme, a man's failure to fulfill
his support obligations results in the forfeiture of certain rights.
Neglect of the duty to support his wife disqualifies him as a "surviving spouse" under the testacy and intestacy provisions of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. 50 His failure to support his family
abolishes the need for his consent if the mother decides to surrender the guardianship and custody of his child to an agency5 1 or
52
place the child in a youth center.
A woman's support obligation, by comparison, is limited. She is
ment, the expense of education, payment of funeral expenses, and other proper and
reasonable expenses."
4See, e.g., Grishaver v. Grishaver, 225 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961)
(hairdresser services "necessary" according to standard of living to which wife was accustomed); New York Tel. Co. v. Teichner, 69 Misc. 2d 135, 329 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Suffolk County
Dist. Ct. 1972) (telephone service "necessary" if consistent with "customary mode of living").
"See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 32 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 412
(McKinney 1963). In Grant v. Grant, 61 Misc. 2d 968, 307 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County 1969), for example, the husband's voluntary retirement was held to have no effect
on his support obligation.
'5N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 32(2) (McKinney 1964); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney
Supp. 1974).
46 In L. v. State, 70 Misc. 2d 660, 335 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Family Ct. Westchester County 1972),
for example, an unemployed father with a proven earning capability of $12,000 to $18,000
per annum was directed to contribute to special education expenses required by his handicapped daughter.
47See, e.g., Drazin v. Drazin, 31 App. Div. 2d 531, 295 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1st Dep't 1968)
(per curiam); Rudnick v. Rudnick, 55 Misc. 2d 532, 285 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Family Ct. Kings
County 1967).
4"E.g., Smith v. Jones, 43 Misc. 2d 350, 250 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Family Ct. Kings County
1964); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 461(a) (McKinney 1963).
49N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
50 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a)(6) (McKinney 1967). This disqualification
deprives the husband of those benefits conferred upon a surviving spouse under id. §§ 4-1.1
(intestate share), 5-1.1 (statutory right of election), 5-1.3 (right to intestate share upon
marriage subsequent to execution of pre-1930 will), 5-3.1 (family exemption), and 5-4.4
(right to share in wrongful death damages). N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 4-1.1,
5-1.1, -1.3, -3.1, -4.4 (McKinney Supp. 1975), amending (McKinney 1967).
51N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(1)(c) (McKinney 1966).
52 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 502(2)(a) (McKinney 1972).
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only liable for her husband's support if he is unable to support
himself and is therefore certain to become a public charge. 53 Even
then, she need only furnish an amount sufficient to prevent him
from becoming a public charge. 54 Furthermore, a mother's duty to
support her children is secondary to that of the father, arising only
in the event of the father's death, abandonment, or inability to
55
support.
The obligations of spousal support exist solely within the context of the matrimonial relationship and cease upon dissolution of
the marriage.5 6 Thereafter, alimony, a wholly statutory creation,
becomes the measure of the man's continuing economic responsibility to the woman.5 7 Under no circumstance can this obligation be
charged to the former wife. 58 The measure of the alimony award is
similar to that used in the determination of the amount of support
owed by a husband to a wife. 5 9 As set forth by statute, the court
possesses discretion to make the award as "justice requires, having
regard to the length of time of the marriage, the ability of the wife
to be self supporting, the circumstances of the case and of the
60
respective parties.
51 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 32(4) (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 415
(McKinney Supp. 1974); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 101(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also
Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, sec. B.
, N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 101(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
5 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 32(3) (McKinney 1964); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 414 (McKinney Supp. 1974); see, e.g., Drazin v. Drazin, 31 App. Div. 2d 531, 295 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Ist Dep't
1968) (per curiam); In re Garcy's Trust, 19 App. Div. 2d 811, 243 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1st Dep't
1963)6 (per curiam).
5 See, e.g., "MM" v. "MM", 39 App. Div. 2d 995, 333 N.Y.S.2d 581 (3d Dep't 1972)
(mem.); Elwell v. Sisson, 81 Misc. 2d 1070, 367 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Family Ct. Yates County
1975).
5
See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also Johnson v. Johnson,
206 N.Y. 561, 100 N.E. 408 (1912); Steinberg v. Steinberg, 46 App. Div. 2d 684, 360
N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.). See generally Fischer & Saxbe, Family Support Obligations:
The Equal ProtectionProblem, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 441 (1974); Foster & Freed, The Economic Effects
of Divorce, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 295 (1973).
"3 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Steinberg, 46 App. Div. 2d 684, 360 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d Dep't 1974)
(mem.), wherein the court denied the husband's petition for alimony, noting that it lacked
the power to fashion a remedy not provided for by statute.
"5See, e.g., Kay v. Kay, 175 N.Y.L.J. 91, Nov. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Oct. 30, 1975) (court
considered husband's potential earnings, wife's needs, and predivorce standard of living);
Smith v. Smith, 53 Misc. 2d 712, 716, 277 N.Y.S.2d 837, 842 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1966)
(statutes defining support and alimony obligations should be construed similarly). Compare
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 32 (McKinney Supp. 1975) and N.Y. FAmuY CT. Acr § 412 (McKinney
1963) with N.Y. Dom. PEL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also notes 43-44 and
accompanying text supra.
"oN.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1975). In Kay v. Kay, 175 N.Y.L.J. 91,
Nov. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Oct. 30, 1975), the court of appeals, acknowledging the relevance
of a wife's ability to support herself, nevertheless concluded that the wife could not be
expected to seek employment in view of her 23-year absence from the labor market. In
Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), the
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Relying as they do on sex as the primary basis for classification, 6' the aforementioned statutes make an unfair and often invalid presumption concerning the respective roles and capabilities
of the parties to a marriage. Instead, laws governing the family
should emphasize the mutuality of spousal responsibility. With
respect to support during the marriage and maintenance upon
dissolution, the "homemaker" and "childrearer," be it husband or
wife, could continue to look to the "breadwinner" to whatever
extent necessary. Legislative reform should be guided accordingly.
Divorce
Of all the grounds for separation 62 and divorce, 63 only one is
blatantly sex based. Wives, but not husbands, may be granted a
64
decree of separation in the event of their spouses' nonsupport.
New York's adoption of a functional approach to support would
necessitate the revision of this ground for separation, making it
available to a husband whose financially able wife fails to support
him.
It is also suggested that the legislature consider substantive
reform of the State's divorce laws. With one notable exception, a
finding of fault is necessary for the dissolution of a marriage. 6 5
Although the grounds for a finding of fault are, in theory, sex
neutral, the fault requirement itself has, in practice, a discriminatory effect. The granting of a divorce to a husband on fault grounds
precludes an award of alimony to a wife.6 6 In an attempt to avoid
court directed the husband to pay his ex-wife, an experienced executive secretary who was
dearly able to be self-supporting, enough alimony to enable her to pursue medical studies.
Having supported her now successful Wall Street attorney husband through his studies, she
was entitled, according to the court, to seek "the same opportunity which she helped give the
defendant." Id. at 621, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 982. Accord, Kover v. Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 278
N.E.2d 886, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1972).
61 Many other statutes found in the Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court Act
are drafted in sexually discriminatory terms. They outline procedures for the institution of
proceedings for support and alimony and for the enforcement of support and alimony
awards. See Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, sec. B.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
63Id. § 170.
62

64Id. § 200(3).
6 Fault grounds upon which the court will award a separation decree or divorce include
adultery, abandonment, imprisonment, and cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. §§ 170, 200.
Absent any fault on the part of either spouse, the parties to a marriage may secure a divorce
if they live separate and apart for a period of one year pursuant to a written separation
agreement which has been filed with the courts. See id. § 170(6).
66 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1975); Hessen v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d
406, 308 N.E.2d 891, 353 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1974); Math v. Math, 39 App. Div. 2d 583, 331
N.Y.S.2d 964 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 693, 298 N.E.2d 549, 337 N.Y.S.2d 505
(1972).
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the harsh result of this forefeiture,6 7 the courts, at least in divorce
proceedings grounded upon cruel and inhuman treatment, generally apply the indicia of fault in a discriminatory fashion depending
on which party is bringing the action . 8 It is not unusual, therefore,
for a plaintiff husband to be required to present a far greater
quantum of proof as to the conduct alleged as the predicate for his
action for divorce than a plaintiff wife would be required to present. 69 Even permitting a man to seek alimony would not alter this
sexually discriminatory policy since it can be expected that the
courts will continue to favor the wife who is more likely to be the
party without adequate means of support.
While this discriminatory practice can perhaps be most easily
eliminated through abolition of the forfeiture rule, it may be argued that continued reliance on the concept of fault as the basis for
marital dissolution is itself of questionable value. 70 The legislature
should consider the adoption of additional nonfault grounds such
as "irretrievable breakdown," a ground for divorce now adopted by
at least half of American jurisdictions. 71 It appears more rational to

'7

This forfeiture appears particularly harsh in light of the present law governing
marital property distribution which law is discussed in text accompanying notes 78-84 infra.
6
See Foster & Freed, supra note 38, at 184; note 69 infra.
Indeed, the court of appeals, in Hessen v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d 406, 308 N.E.2d 891, 353
N.Y.S.2d 421 (1974), sanctioned the practice of weighing the evidence supporting a charge
of fault with an eye to the consequences of a finding of fault. In recommending that the
courts use their discretion in considering the circumstances of each case, the court noted:
Moreover, and perhaps most important, the Legislature could not have intended so
broad an application of the cruel and inhuman treatment ground where its effect
would be to deprive a defendant wife of support.
Id. at 410, 308 N.E.2d at 894, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
"' Compare Hessen v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d 406, 308 N.E.2d 891, 351 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1974)
and Rios v. Rios, 34 App. Div. 2d 325, 311 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1970), affd mem., 29
N.Y.2d 840, 277 N.E.2d 786, 327 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1971) (divorce denied plaintiff husband)
with Cinquemani v. Cinquemani, 42 App. Div. 2d 851, 346 N.Y.S.2d 875 (2d Dep't 1973) and
Berlin v. Berlin, 64 Misc. 2d 352, 314 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970), modified
on other grounds, 36 App. Div. 2d 763, 321 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep't 1971) (divorce granted
plaintiff wife).
This partiality in favor of the woman is less frequent when the ground sued upon entails
a more objective and definite incident of fault such as adultery or abandonment. See, e.g.,
Schine v. Schine, 31 N.Y.2d 113, 286 N.E.2d 449, 335 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1972) (divorce granted
husband and alimony denied wife who locked husband out of domicile); Recht v. Recht, 36
App. Div. 2d 939, 321 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1st Dep't 1971) (divorce granted husband and alimony
denied wife found guilty of adultery).
70 The inequities of the present divorce law and the need for a reform which would
emphasize the needs and capabilities of the parties rather than the circumstances of marital
misconduct has been discussed by judges and commentators alike. See, e.g., Popper v.
Popper, 173 N.Y.L.J. 28, Apr. 29, 1975, at 17, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); LEVY, supra
note 38, at 41-118; Foster & Freed, supra note 38, at 184-86; Teitelbaum, Cruelty Divorce
Under New York's Reform Act: On Repeating Ancient Error, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1973).
71 Freed, GroundsforDivorce in AmericanJurisdictions, 8 FAMmY L.Q. 401, 421-22 (1974);
see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.06(2)(6) (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 48-341 (Spec.
Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1974).
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permit two parties who have freely entered into a relationship to
dissolve that union by mutual consent when there is "no reasonable
17 2
prospect of reconciliation.
Distribution of Marital Property
New York's marital property law is based on the common law
system. 73 At common law, a woman lost all legal identity upon
marriage; her husband assumed all rights to control, manage, and
convey her property.7 4 By virtue of the Married Women's Property
Acts 75 and later corollary statutes,7 6 a wife was given the right to
retain title to property she brought to the marriage or separately
acquired during marriage. Moreover, she was given the right to
contract, manage, control, and devise her property.
These statutory abrogations of the common law rules, however, gave a wife no interest in her husband's property. Just as she
retained control over her separately acquired property, he retained
control over his. 7 7 Thus, under present law, a wife has no interest
in either the husband's compensation or in the property he aquires
therewith, whether real or personal. 78 She acquires an interest in
72 UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 305(C).

Senator Goodman recently sponsored a bill that would add an irretrievable breakdown
concept to New York divorce law. His bill provides that a divorce should be granted upon
proof that
(1) The marriage is irretrievably broken and that further attempts at reconciliation
would be futile or impracticable and not in the best interests of the parties or the
family. The fact that the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for a
period of one or more years shall be presumptive evidence that the marriage is
irretrievably broken.
N.Y.S. 922, 198th Sess. (1975). See also N.Y.S. 887, 198th Sess. (1975) (irretrievable breakdown substituted for all other grounds of divorce).
'3 For a careful analysis of the roots of the New York form of marital property
ownership and a discussion of necessary reforms, see Johnston, Sex and Property:The Common
Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L Rv.
1033 (1972).
The common law system of marital property law is to be distinguished from the
community property system followed in Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Under this system, each spouse is deemed to own half of all
property and income acquired during marriage. In some of these states, however, the
husband retains a right to manage and control the community property. See, e.g., LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971); NEv. REv: STAT. § 123.230 (1973). See generally Younger,

Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 211 (1973).
7

4 E.g., CLARK, supra note 38, ch. 7; L. KANOWrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW-

THE UN-

FINISHED REVOLUTION 35-41 (1969).
75 Ch.

200,

§§

1, 2, [1848] N.Y. Laws 307 (now N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 50 (McKinney

1964)).
7

6 See Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, sec. G.
7

See Foster & Freed, supra note 38, at 172-75; Gabler, The Impact of the ERA on Domestic
Law: Specific Focus on California, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 51, 79 (1974).
Relations
78
See, e.g., Kroul v. Kroul, 42 App. Div. 2d 584, 344 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep't 1973);
Manheim v. Manheim, 60 Misc. 2d 88, 302 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. CL Nassau County 1969),
aff'd mem., 34 App. Div. 2d 735, 310 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (2d Dep't 1970).

1975]

SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION

his property only if title is conveyed to them jointly7 9 or if it is

determined that the husband intended a gift to the wife 80 or held
the property for her in constructive trust.81
Upon divorce, these principles work against the wife8 2 who,
not being a principal wage earner, has had little opportunity to
independently acquire title to property. 83 As a consequence, she
finds herself wholly dependent upon the alimony award. 84 Because
this is a result of her disadvantaged position rather than of her sex,

per se, even an ERA would not have required a change of these
rules.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the present laws governing
the economics of marital property dissolution be restructured. 85 As
suggested by many commentators, the homemaking task, as as-

sumed by either party or as shared by the parties, should be
recognized as a valid and valuable contribution to the marriage.86
Each party should be accorded an interest in the other's income
and, regardless of the form in which title is taken, in the property
7 See N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUST LAW § 6-2.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975).

"' See Lindt V. Henshel, 25 N.Y.2d 357, 254 N.E.2d 746, 306 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1969),
wherein the court found that the husband's payment for a statue that his wife had selected
and contracted to purchase could be considered a gift to his wife. Conversely, in Manheim v.
Manheim, 60 Misc. 2d 88, 302 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969), affd mem., 34
App. Div. 2d 735, 310 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (2d Dep't 1970), the court, finding insufficient
evidence of a gift on the part of the husband, ordered the wife to return certain household
goods.
81 In Janke v. Janke, 47 App. Div. 2d 445, 366 N.Y.S.2d 910 (4th Dep't 1975), the wife
successfully sued for a V interest in a tavern business owned by the husband. The court
found that a constructive trust existed where the wife had contributed to the business
operation full-time services for a 12-year period as well as a cash inheritance. In Wirth v.
Wirth, 38 App. Div. 2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (3d Dep't 1971), however, no constructive
trust was found. There, the former wife sought a declaratory judgment that she was half
owner of her former husband's home, insurance policies, investments, and savings even
though he had taken title to them in his own name and had paid for them with his own
income. The wife claimed that a constructive trust had arisen by virtue of the fact that the
parties' agreement to use her income for the family's living expenses discharged the husband
from his support obligation, thus enabling him to acquire the substantial assets in question.
The court found that in the absence of concealment or misrepresentation, no constructive
trust 2had arisen.
8 See authorities cited note 38 supra.
11 N.Y. DOM. REt. LAw § 234 (McKinney 1964) gives the court presiding over a divorce
proceeding authority to determine questions of title upon the dissolution of a marriage.
While possession to property may be awarded as justice requires, ownership must be
awarded to the party holding title. See, e.g., McGuigan v. McGuigan, 46 App. Div. 2d 665,
359 N.Y.S.2d 842 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
14See, e.g., Kay v. Kay, 115 N.Y.L.J. 91, Nov. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Oct. 30, 1975).
"5For specific suggestions as to the reform of the New York laws on marital property,
see Foster & Freed, supra note 38; Comment, MaritalProperty:A New Look at Old Inequities, 39
ALBANY L. REv. 52 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MaritalInequities); Note, Marriage Contractsfor
Support and Services: ConstitutionalityBegins at Home, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1161 (1974).
"See, e.g., DAvmsoN, supra note 2, at 186-96; Brown, supra note 2, at 946; Foster &
Freed, supra note 38, at 175.
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acquired therewith during the marriage. Upon termination of the
marriage, rights to property should be determined according to
equitable principles, taking into account the relative contributions
of each party.87 Furthermore, the non-wage-earning spouse should
be awarded maintenance to allow for eventual self-sufficiency. 88 In
determining these rights, the court should consider, "as justice
requires," the circumstances of the case, the needs and means of
the parties, and their respective prospects of future financial security.8 9
SEX-PLUS-AGE DISCRIMINATION

In several areas of New York law, sex-plus-age discrimination
determines the allocation of certain legal rights. In effect, persons
of the same age are denied equal rights because of their sex.90
Inasmuch as this type of discrimination largely reflects outmoded
notions of the roles and capabilities of both men and women, it is
submitted that such statutes be revised so as to apply equally to
members of both sexes.
Marital Age
While both men and women may marry at the age of 18
without parental consent, 91 the age at which minors may marry
87 Several theories of marital property ownership exist. The "partnership" notion presumes that all property acquired during marriage, regardless of the form in which title is
taken, is held by the spouses as tenants by the entirety and upon dissolution should be
distributed on a 50-50 basis. This dosely resembles the community form of marital property
ownership. Proponents of this theory generally advise that, if warranted by special circumstances, the court should be afforded discretion in making the distribution. Thus, if one
party has made only a negligible contribution to the familial relationship or to the family
assets, the court could award that party less than a half interest. See Foster & Freed, supra
note 38, at 176-77; Marital Inequities, supra note 85, at 76-79.
"Equitable" distribution of property, another theory, does not rest solely on a presumption of joint ownership. It requires the exercise of judicial discretion so that apportionment
might be effected on the basis of subjective criteria including the parties' respective education, talents, estates, ages, and liabilities. See id. at 79. This approach is incorporated in the
UNIFORM

MARRIAGE AND

DIVORCE

ACT § 307 and is embodied in a bill proposing the

amendment of N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1975). N.Y.A. 7840, 198th Sess.
(1975). The bill was passed by the State Assembly in 1975 and will be considered by the State
Senate in 1976. Foster & Freed, Recent Developments in Family Law-I, 175 N.Y.LJ. 86, Oct.
31, 1975, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 2.
88 See, e.g., Foster & Freed, supra note 38, at 191; MaritalInequities, supra note 85, at 79.
89
See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307.
90 Certain statutes incorporating sex-plus-age discrimination have been found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)
(father required to support male children until they reached the age of 21 but female
children only until the age of 18); In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972), discussed in note 18 supra.
91 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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with parental consent is 14 for women and 16 for men. 92 This
distinction is premised on the traditional view that females mature
earlier than males, both physically and psychologically. 93 It is also
reflective of the popular belief that men should postpone marriage
until they are prepared for a career and the burdens of family
4
support.

9

Equalization of the minimal marital age is not a simple task.
Among the factors to be considered in determining a proper age
are the frequent instability of youthful marriages, on the one hand,
and the increase in adolescent promiscuity, on the other. Society's
interest in marital stability must be balanced against the merits of
increased accessibility to marriage. 95 If it is determined that a
younger marital age would encourage more youthful marriages
and promote marital instability, the legislature might conclude that
an older marital age for both sexes would best serve the public
96
interest.
Penal and Corrections Law
Sex-plus-age discrimination also appears in the Penal Law provision proscribing the endangerment of the welfare of a child. 97
Potential victims of this crime are defined as males under the age
of 16 and females under the age of 17.98 There appears to be no
reason to deny 16-year-old males the same protection against
"scheming and cunning adults" 99 afforded 16-year-old females.
The Corrections Law specifies that incarcerated males between
the ages of 16 and 21 may not be placed in the same correctional
91
2Id. See generally LEVY, supra note 38, at 23-26; Brown, supra note 2, at 938-39; Note,

The Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act-Marital Age Provisions, 57 MINN. L. REV. 179 (1972).
93 See DAVIDSON, supra note 2, at 119-23; L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 10-13 (1969).
94See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975).
9 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 38, § 2.9, at 78; Note, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act-Marital Age Provisions, 57 MINN. L. REv. 179, 181-89 (1972).
" Other American jurisdictions which have considered equalization of the minimal
marital age have reached varying contusions. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-02 (Supp.
1975) (marital age for females raised to 18, the prescribed age for males) with VA. CODE:
ANN. § 20-48 (Supp. 1975) (marital age for males lowered to 16, the prescribed age for
females). The UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 203 provides that both males and
females may marry at the age of 18 without consent and at the age of 16 with consent.
The legislature should also consider the utility of a separate age requirement for
marriage with parental consent. The three-tiered statutory scheme of marital age- no
marriage before a certain age, marriage with parental consent at an intermediate age, and
unrestricted marriage after a certain age - has been criticized. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 38,
at 23-26; Note The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act -Marital Age Provisions, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 179, 190-93 (1972).
17 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
9
8Id.
99 [1970] N.Y. Laws 2927 (McKinney) (Legis. Memo.).
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facility as older males. 0 0 Young females, however, are not accorded similar protection from the corruptive influences of older
female inmates, 1 1 there being only one state facility for female
prisoners.' 0 2 The State's unequal protection of women in this regard is inexcusable when a like benefit could easily be conferred
through other means short of the use of a separate facility, such as
the designation of separate corridors within the existing facility for
03
young female inmates.
Senior Citizens' Benefits

At the other end of the age spectrum, sex-plus-age discrimination appears in several statutes concerning the distribution of state
pension funds. Presently, under the Supplemental Pension Act, 10 4
the maximum retirement allowance or pension is available to
women at age 62. A man does not qualify for the maximum
amount until he is 65.105 This differential is repeated in other
10 6
provisions pertaining to state-subsidized low-income housing.
Thus, females who are recipients of social security payments and
private pension funds at age 62 may exclude $75.00 a month of
such payments from the computation of their income in order to
qualify as a low-income tenant. Male recipients of these funds may
only claim the $75.00 exclusion at age 65.107
These provisions were originally designed to conform state law
to the federal social security benefit structure which also gave
women a three-year preferential over men.' 0 8 Recently, however,
' N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 71(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975).

See generally Singer, Women and the Correctional Process, 11 AM. CuM. L. REv. 295
(1973). This failure to afford young female inmates protection from older female inmates is
surprising in view of the extra protection from corruptive adult influences now afforded
women by virtue of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney Supp. 1975). discussed in text
accompanying
notes 97-99 supra.
2
1'
See Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, at H-1.
103 The suggestion of having separate corridors within a prison has been incorporated
into bills proposing coed facilities. See, e.g., N.Y.S. 5523, N.Y.A. 8066, 198th Sess. (1975).
101

104 N.Y. RETIREMENT & Soc. SEC. LAW §§ 160-73 (McKinney 1971).

105

Id. §§ 161(1)-(2), 163(2)(b)-(3), (5)(a)-(b).

106 N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 156(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also N.Y. PRIV. Hous.
FIN. LAw § 401(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
107 N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAw § 156(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975).

108Act of June 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 103(a), 75 Stat. 137, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 414(a)(1) (Supp. III, 1973). The constitutionality of this 3-year preference given women in the social security benefit structure was upheld in Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390
F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968). There, the court reasoned that the
distinction was compensatory in nature and reasonably designed to offset the economic
discrimination suffered by women throughout their working careers. Similar logic was
applied in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), wherein the Court upheld the validity of a
limited tax exemption for widows.
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the federal- computation schedule was equalized so that all persons
62 and over are treated alike. 10 9 The legislature should consider
amending New York's statutes to maintain consistency between
federal and state benefit programs.
SURVIVORS' BENEFITS

Throughout several areas of New York statutory law, numerous provisions specify widows, mothers, and dependent children,
but not widowers, as the recipients of survivors' benefits."a 0 For
2
example, widows, but not widowers, of veterans,"' city officers,"1
state employees,"13 teachers, 114 policemen, and firemen" 15 are entifled to receive annuities and pension and death benefits. Widows of
veterans may be cared for in veterans' hospitals," 6 may be buried
at the expense of the State," 7 and are entitled to a refund of the
veterans' tax payment for the year in which he died.' 8 Widows of
veterans also enjoy a preference in public housing eligibility,'1 9 and
widows of veterans and clergymen may claim a limited exemption
from real property taxes.' 20 Under the Workmen's Compensation
Law, widows, but not widowers, of a deceased employee are entided to a minimum death benefit.' 21 And compensation due a
deceased claimant is awarded a "surviving widow," but only a
' 22
"dependent widower.'
It is doubtful that such provisions could withstand constitu10 9See, e.g., Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 104(a), 86 Stat. 1340,,amending
42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(1) (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(I) (Supp. III, 1973)).
10 For an extensive list of New York's discriminatory survivors' benefits statutes, see
Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, sec. C.
11
E.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 362(2)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1972); N.Y. MIL. LAw § 217(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1975).
112 N.Y. GEN. CiTY LAw § 20(20) (McKinney 1968).
1,3N.Y. REIREIMENT & Soc. SEC. LAW § 61(d)(1) (McKinney 1971).
114 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 532(d) (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. RETImEMENT & Soc. SEC.
LAw §§ 162(2)-(3) (McKinney 1971).
11
"'E.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 227(1) (McKinney Supp. r975); N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. Law §
208-b(3) (McKinney 1974).
116N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2630, 2632(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
117 N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw § 148(I)(a) (McKinney 1965). This free burial accorded
widows of veterans, however, is limited to those who have not left sufficient funds to defray
such expenses.
118 N.Y. GEN.CiTy LAw § 25-a-76(c) (McKinney 1968); N.Y. TAx-LAw § 696(c) (McKinney 1975).
"I N.Y. Pun. Hous. LAw § 156(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also N.Y. PRIV. Hous.
FIN. LAw § 31(7) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
120 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw § 458 (McKinney Supp. 1975); id. § 460 (McKinney 1972).
Both of these statutes spedfy that the widow of the veteran or clergyman does not qualify
for the
real property tax exemption if she has remarried.
121 See N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMp. LAw § 16(5) (McKinney Supp. .1975).
22
1 d. 99 15(4), 16(1-b), (2)-(4) (McKinney 1965).
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tional attack. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,' 2 3 the United States Supreme Court held that provisions of the Social Security Act granting benefits only to widows unconstitutionally discriminated against
female wage earners inasmuch as they acquired less protection for
their families than did men similarly situated. 124 In Frontiero v.
Richardson,1 25 the Court invalidated an armed forces' policy requiring servicewomen to prove their husbands' dependency in
order to qualify for increased benefits, such benefits having been
available to married servicemen without proof of their wives' de26
pendency.1
The New York statutes noted above extend to widows of certain men benefits not available to widowers of women identically
situated.' 2 7 To remove this inequity, the benefits conferred in each
statute may either be extended to widowers 2 8 or withdrawn altogether, Alternatively, the entire survivors' benefits scheme could
be restructured on the sex-neutral criterion of dependency.
123420 U.S. 636 (1975).
124Id. at 645. The provision of the Social Security Act challenged in Wiesenfeld awarded

insurance benefits to widows who had not remarried and had the responsibility for caring for
a child. Despite the fact that female wage earners were required to pay social security taxes,
no equivalent provision existed for the payment of benefits to their widowers. Id. at 637 n. 1,
645, 653. The Court noted that the challenged provision rested on an
"archaic and overbroad" generalization... that male workers' earnings are vital to
the support of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not
significantly contribute to their families' support.
Id. at 643 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
In rendering its decision, the Court in Wiesenfeld distinguished its earlier opinion in
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), wherein a Florida statute granting a special tax
exemption to widows withstood constitutional attack. The statutory classification in Kahn was
considered benign and compensatory in that it was "reasonably designed to further the state
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss
imposes a disproportionately heavy burden." Id. at 355. In contrast, the Wiesenfeld provision
penalized female wage earners by limiting the benefits they could acquire through the social
security program.
125411 U.S. 677 (1973).
126The armed forces rule in Frontiero, like the social security provision challenged in
Wiesenfeld, presumed a wife's dependence on her spouse's income. Id. at 688-89.
127In some instances, it can be argued that the benefits afforded survivors in New
York's statutory scheme have the same benign purpose as the statute upheld in Kahn,
discussed in note 124 supra. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW §§ 458(1), (3) (McKinney
Supp. 1975). For the most part, however, the New York statutes, like the provision invalidated in Wiesenfeld, unilaterally limit the accrual of benefits in the case of the family of a
female wage earner. See, e.g., N.Y. RETIREMENT & SOC. SEC. LAw §§ 61(d), (1), 162(2)
(McKinney 1971).
128Across-the-board extension of survivors' benefits to widowers would entail a considerable commitment of funds. The State Office of the Comptroller is presently studying ways
in which the sexually discriminatory distinctions of these provisions might be removed with
the least adverse economic ramifications. Telephone interview with Ms. Joyce Pulliam, N.Y.
State Law Revision Comm'n, Oct. 21, 1975.
In Washington, the widows' benefits provisions were extended to widowers in response
to the enactment of a state ERA. Dybwad, supra note 5, at 587-89.
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UNIQUE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Statutes that deal with physical characteristics unique to one
sex raise special questions to the reformer committed to the eradication of sex discrimination from the law. These statutes employ
classifications relying upon sex because they are directed towards
circumstances encountered only by one sex by reason of inherent
and unique biological traits.' 2 9 Nonetheless, they must be carefully
scrutinized since reliance on a physical characteristic may be no
more than a guise for sex discrimination. 13 0 Statutes requiring
special analysis in this regard include those dealing with pregnancy,
rape, and illegitimacy.
Pregnancy
New York employers are required by law to provide disability
coverage for their employees.l 3 1 In lieu of wages, disability payments are made to employees who are unable to work due to a
nonoccupational injury or sickness.' 32 Under the present law,
pregnancy-related disabilities are the only physical condition spe33
cifically excluded from coverage.
New York's insurance program is similar to the California
system which was attacked for its exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities in Geduldig v. Aiello. 13 4 In Aiello, the Supreme Court held
that this exclusion from coverage did not constitute invidious dis129Because inherent and unique physical characteristics are involved, in many cases
classifications relying upon sex must be retained. For example, if the father of a child is
unknown, the birth certificate must be in the mother's name. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §
4135 (McKinney Supp. 1975). Unlawful nudity can include exposure of the female breast
but not of the male breast because the female breasf is considered a sexual organ while the
male breast is not so recognized. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 245.00-.02 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
130Brown, supra note 2, at 894.
131See N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAw § 202 (McKinney 1965).
13 2
Id. § 204 (McKinney Supp. 1975), amending (McKinney 1965); id. § 201(9) (McKinney
1965).3 3
1 Id. § 205(3) (McKinney 1965) states that benefits cannot be claimed
for any period of disability caused by or arising in connection with a pregnancy,
except any such period occurring after return to employment with a covered
employer for a period of two consecutive weeks following termination of such
pregnancy ....
Unlike the pregnancy exclusion, other exclusions relate not to the nature of the illness,
but to the circumstances of its contraction or treatment. Excluded from coverage are
illnesses extending over a specified length of time, illnesses treated by unauthorized physicians, injuries due to an employee's willful or illegal act, injuries due to an act of war, and
injuries due to motor vehicle accidents. Id. § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1975), amending (McKinney 1965).
134 417 U.S. 484, 487 (1974), discussed in Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy
Classjilcations and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 441 (1975).
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crimination under the equal protection clause.' 35 In a footnote, the
1 36
Court observed that pregnancy is not a sex-based classification.
Consequently, given California's interest in preserving the financial
integrity of its self-insurance plan, the pregnancy exclusion was
37
upheld as being rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
Application of the Aiello rationale to New York's insurance
program would most likely result in an identical holding. It has
been suggested, however, that Aiello is not necessarily controlling in
New York.' 38 New York's Human Rights Law' 39 provides that
140
freedom from sex discrimination in employment is a civil right.
In Union Free School District No. 6 (Town of Islip) v. New York State
Human Rights Appeal Board,' 4' the New York Court of Appeals
explicitly rejected the Aiello analysis as controlling 42 and construed
the Human Rights Law as prohibiting public employers from treating pregnancy and maternity differently from other temporary
disabilities with respect to the payment of sick leave benefits. 1 43 In
reaching this conclusion, the court did not address the question of
whether the Human Rights Law would have a similar effect when
applied to private employers. It would appear from Town of Islip
44
and earlier cases relating to mandatory maternity leave policies,
135417 U.S. at 494. Whereas the New York statute excludes all pregnancy-related
disabilities, the California exclusionary provision was limited to normal pregnancies.
136 In what has come to be known as Aiello's "Footnote 20," the Court noted:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification ....
Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere
pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one
sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as
with respect to any other physical condition.
• . . The program divides potential recipients into two groups - pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes.
Id. at37496-97 n.20.

1 Id. at 496.
38
1 Schair, Sex Discrimination:The Pregnancy-RelatedDisability Exclusion, 49 ST. JoHN's L.

Rxv. 684, 710 (1975).
139N.Y. ExEC. LAw §§ 290 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1975), amending (McKinney 1972).
"1Id. § 291(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
14135 N.Y.2d 371, 320 N.E.2d 859, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1974).
142 The court of appeals noted that it was not "unmindful of' the Aiello decision finding
California's pregnancy-related disability exclusion not violative of the equal protection
clause. The court further observed, however, that the fact that the policies challenged in
Town of Islip might not be constitutionally forbidden was irrelevant to its determination of
whether the New York provision violated the more strict statutory proscription of the
Human Rights Law. Id. at 376, 320 N.E.2d at 860, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 141, 142.
143 Id.
4'Three decisions of the appellate division invalidating mandatory maternity leave
policies of local boards of education as violative of the Human Rights Law were affirmed by
the court of appeals. The appellate division found that the Human Rights Law required a
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however, that the New York Court of Appeals will ultimately conclude, on the basis of a broad reading of the Human Rights Law,
that pregnancy cannot be treated any differently from other tem14 5
porary disabilities.
The greatest impediment to extending temporary disability
benefits to pregnant women has been the fear of its prohibitive
cost. 1 4 6 Estimates of the consequential financial burden on employers vary With the degree of coverage contemplated, the number of
women employees likely to become pregnant, and the length of
time for which payments would be made. 47 This excuse for legislative inertia, however, overlooks the fact that if the legislature is to
give the Human Rights Law full effect, pregnancy should be
treated like any other temporary disability. 48 Moreover, the financial objections to inclusion of pregnancy could be mitigated by a
scaling down of the maximum benefits allowed for all temporary
disabilities.
standard of review more stringent than the rational basis test of the fourteenth amendment.
Board of Educ. (East Wiliston) v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App. Div. 2d
49, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1973), affd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 674, 319 N.E.2d 202, 360
N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974); Board of Educ. (City of New York) v. New York State Div. of Human
Rights, 42 App. Div. 2d 854, 346 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd merm., "35N.Y.2d 675,
319 N.E.2d 203, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974); Board of Educ. (Oyster Bay and Babylon) v. New
York State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App. Div. 2d 600, 345 N.Y.S.2d 101 (2d Dep't 1973),
affd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 677, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1974). Subsequent to these
decisions, the United States Supreme Court invalidated compulsory maternity leaves on the
ground that they create an impermissible, irrebuttable presumption of incapacity. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
"' In Board of Educ. (East Williston) v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App.
Div. 2d 49, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1973), affd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 673, 319 N.E.2d 202, 360
N.Y.S.2d 587 (1974), the appellate division noted:
The policy does present a manifest infirmity by singling out pregnancy among all
other physical conditions to which a teacher might be subject as a category for
special treatment.... In the case of other conditions such as ailments or the onset
of disease, a leave of absence is not required.., until medical necessity is demonstrated .... Hence, the female teacher is placed under a restriction dependent on
sex alone by the terms of the petitioner s policy.
42 App.
Div. 2d at 53, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
146
See

WOMEN

493-96.

TASK FORCE ON CRITICAL PROBLEMS, NEw

YORK

STATE SENATE, INSURANCE AND

25 (1974). Cost was a considerable factor in the Aiello Court's decision. 417 U.S. at

147 A study of the cost of extending coverage to include pregnancy-related disabilities
approximated increases ranging from $12 million annually, based on a 7-week benefit
period and a $54.00 per week payment to 28,000 claimants; to $100 million annually, based
on a 26-week benefit period with payments of $95.00 per week to 54,000 claimants. TASK
FORCE ON CRITICAL PROBLEMS, NEW YORK STATE SENATE, INSURANCE AND WOMEN

25 (1974).

It should be noted that the guidelines to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), treat
pregnancy like any other temporary disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1974). The Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari to parties challenging the exclusion of pregnancy from
disability plans created by private employers. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 96 S. Ct. 36,
granting cert. to 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., v. Wetzel, 421 U.S.
987, granting cert. to 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975).
14
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Commitment to the view that pregnancy should be treated like
any other disability also necessitates reevaluation of the present
Labor Law provision prohibiting the employment of a woman
within four weeks after childbirth unless she presents a physician's
written statement of her fitness to return to the job. 1 49 No similar

restriction is imposed on males who take disability leaves. It is
suggested that this statute either be repealed or revised to require
that all employees forced to take temporary leaves obtain a physician's statement of fitness.
Rape

The crime of rape can only be committed against a woman.' 50
Despite the sexual bias in the crime's definition, the State's rape
laws, when viewed as a part of the entire statutory scheme of sex
offenses,' 5 ' may be sustained, since they rest on physical charac15 2
teristics unique to each sex.
Forcible rape is defined as the unconsented to act of sexual
intercourse, 1 53 sexual intercourse occurring upon any penetration
of the vagina by the penis.' 5 4 In distinguishing rape as a crime that
can be committed only against a female, the legislature has expressed a special interest in the protection of a woman's vagina,155 likely
because the penetration of this orifice by the male sex organ may
result in pregnancy.' 56 In addition, it is commonly recognized that
sexual attacks upon women often result in severe physical and
emotional injury. In denying males similar protection against sexual intercourse forcibly induced by females, the legislature has
149 N.Y. LABOR LAw § 206-b (McKinney Supp. 1975). In addition to the physician's
statement, a woman seeking to return to work within four weeks of childbirth must present
her own written statement expressing her desire to return to the job. Id.
159 N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 130.25-.35 (McKinney 1975).
151 Id. §§ 130.00-.65. These statutes delineate the crimes of sexual misconduct, rape,
sodomy, and sexual abuse.
1s2 Brown, supra note 2, at 955. Sex-based rape laws have withstood constitutional attack
on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 11l Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 935 (1975); State v. Price, 215 Kan. 718, 529 P.2d 85 (1974); Flores v. State,
69 Wis. 2d 509, 230 N.W.2d 637 (1975); State v. Ewald, 63 Wis. 2d 165, 216 N.W.2d 213
(1974). Even in states that have enacted their own ERA's, sex-based definitions of rape have
been upheld. See, e.g., People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973); People v.
Medrano, 24 Ill. App. 3d 429, 321 N.E.2d 97 (1974); Brooks v. State, 24 Md. App. 334, 330
A.2d 670 (1975).
13 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25-.35 (McKinney 1975).
154
Id. § 130.00(1).
1' See, e.g., L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 18
(1969); Brown, supra note 2, at 955-61. See also Note, Sex Discriminationin the Criminal Law:
The Effect of the Equal Rights Amendment, 11 AM. GRIM. L. Rv. 469 (1973); Comment, Rape
and Rape
Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 919 (1973).
156
See State v. Price, 215 Kan. 718, 723, 529 P.2d 85, 89 (1974); State v. Ewald, 63 Wis.
2d 165, 173-74, 216 N.W.2d 213, 218 (1974).
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apparently concluded that such a circumstance is unlikely to occur
and, if it did, the male would suffer little emotional or physical
injury.1 5 7 In any event, other penal statutes adequately protect
males from sexual assaults. Forcible sodomy, 15 8 a crime as serious
as rape, 15 9 proscribes homosexual and heterosexual deviate sex
acts.16 0 This is conduct, other than intercourse, that requires con61
tact between a bodily orifice and the physical organ of another.1
By virtue of these parallel sodomy and rape provisions, 62 both
sexes are accorded similar protection against similar acts of unconsented sexual contact.
One additional aspect of New York's rape laws deserving of
attention concerns those statutes outlining the crime of statutory
rape. 16 3 This crime occurs when a male has intercourse with a
female under the age of 17, who, because of her youth, is deemed
incapable of giving consent.' 6 4 This statutory presumption may be
justified by the State's special interest in protecting young women
from pregnancy. 65 Since this condition is unique to women, it is
not as essential to protect young males from seduction by older
females. 6 6 Nevertheless, a similar presumption of inability to con67
sent due to nonage is incorporated in the sodomy statutes.1
Taken as a whole, therefore, New York's statutory scheme of sex
'5 In Brooks v. State, 24 Md. App. 334, 330 A.2d 670 (1975), the court, in dismissing
the defendant's contention that the rape laws unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of
sex, noted:
The equality of the sexes expresses a societal goal, not a physical metamorphosis. It
would be anomalous indeed if our aspirations toward the ideal of equality under
the law caused us to overlook our disparate .human vulnerabilities.
Id. at 339, 330 A.2d at 673. In State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 935 (1975), the court perceived "no need by males for protection against females
from rape which would be sufficient to demand legislative attention." Id. at -, 526 P.2d at
723.
'5 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.40-.50 (McKinney 1975).
150 Sodomy and rape in the third degree are class E felonies punishable by one to four
years imprisonment. Id. §§ 10.00(5), 70.00(2)(e), 130.25, .40. In the first degree, these crimes
are both class B felonies punishable by up to 25 years imprisonment. Id. §§ 10.00(5),
70.00(2)(b), 130.35-.50. This parallel structure was intentional. TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N
ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED NEW YORK PENAL LAW 343
(1964).
160 N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 130.40-.50 (McKinney 1975).
161Deviate sex acts entail contact "between the penis and the anus, the mouth and the
penis, or the mouth and the vulva." Id. § 130.00(2).
162
See note 159 supra.
163 Statutory rape, if the female is under 17 and the male is over 21, is charged in the
third degree. If the victim is less than 14, the charge is second degree rape if the male is over
18. First degree rape occurs if she is less than 11. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25-.35 (McKinney
1975).
164
Id. § 130.05(3)(a).
16'See Flores v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 509, 230 N.W.2d 637 (1975).
1 66
See People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973).
167 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.40-.50 (McKinney 1975).
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offenses does not appear to invidiously discriminate against either
sex. Both males and females are protected against forced sexual
attack and young members of both sexes are presumed incapable
of consenting to the proscribed acts.
It can be argued, however, that by separately defining the two
types of unlawful sexual activity-rape and sodomy-these laws
do not clearly reflect as the paramount concern the State's interest
in protecting all persons from bodily intrusion. 16 8 Other states, in
reforming their rape laws, have generally proscribed "sexual
penetration," that is, all unlawful intrusions of bodily orifices by
any object.' 69 By focusing on the act itself, these statutory schemes
punish and protect members of both sexes equally, measuring such
punishment and protection according to the degree of force exercised, the victim's vulnerability, and, in the case of minors, the
relative ages of the actor and victim.' 70 Though New York's sexual
assault laws are not discriminatory in effect, adoption of this type
of sex-neutral statutory scheme would appear to merit legislative
consideration.
Illegitimacy
Currently, the rights and responsibilities of a father vis-h-vis
his illegitimate child are substantially less than those of the
mother. 17 Arguably, this unequal treatment is a product of the
"unique physical characteristics" inherent in parenthood. Maternity
is an easily identifiable condition, whereas paternity is often impossible to establish.' 7 2 Given this fact, some sex-based classifications in
this area of the law may be justified.' 73 It seems reasonable that if
168 See, e.g., Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv.
919, 941 (1973).
169 "Sexual penetration," as defined in Michigan's revised sex offense statute, includes
sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, and all other intrusions of any
object into the physical openings of another. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520a (Supp.
1975); accord, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (Supp. 1975).
""See note 169 supra.
171 For a valuable study, focusing on New York law, of the inequitable treatment
accorded the illegitimate child and his father, see, Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 479 (1974).
17 The evidence supporting a charge of paternity must be so clear and convincing as to
completely satisfy the trier, of fact that the respondent is the father of the child. See, e.g.,
Edick v. Martin, 34 App. Div. 2d 1096, 312 N.Y.S.2d 427 (4th Dep't 1970) (mem); Gray v.
Rose, 32 App. Div. 2d 994, 302 N.Y.S.2d 185 (3d Dep't 1969) (per curiam). It should be
noted that while the mother's testimony need not be corroborated, Comm'r of Soc. Serv. v.
S., 75 Misc. 2d 971, 348 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Family Ct. Bronx County 1973), the alleged father's
testimony concerning the access of others must be. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Act § 531 (McKinney
1963).
'73 See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4135 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (birth certificate of
out-of-wedlock child in mother's name alone).
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the father of a child is unknown, the obligation to support the child
must be imposed upon the mother.' 7 4 She also should be entitled
to surrender the child for adoption17 and enjoy fully all other
parental rights.
It is in the case of the father who is known or who can be
identified that the present laws work the greatest injustice. Without
adjudication17 6 or acknowledgment 7 7 of paternity, his rights and
responsibilities vis-A-vis his child are most limited.17 8 This policy
would appear just, except for the fact that under the Family Court
Act he has no standing to initiate a proceeding to gain legal recog7 9
nition of his paternity.
Adjudication or acknowledgment results in the imposition of a
17 4 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 33(5) (McKinney 1964).
17 5 See id. § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
176 Paternity proceedings are outlined in article 5 of the Family Court Act. See N.Y.
FAMILY CT. AcT §§ 511 et seq. (McKinney 1975), amending (McKinney 1963). Except in
limited instances these proceedings must be brought within two years of the child's birth. Id.
§ 517 (McKinney 1963). Orders of filiation serve a dual purpose. They declare paternity and
secure support for the child. E.g., Johnson v. Berger, 51 Mis- 2d 513, 515, 273 N.Y.S.2d
484, 487 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
177"Acknowledgment" of paternity removes the bar of .ie 2-year statute of limitations
on the institution of a filiation proceeding. N.Y. FAMiLY CT. ACT § 517(a) (McKinney 1963).
Acknowledgment must be in writing or declared in court and must-indicate a willingness to
accept paternal responsibility for the child. Id. See, e.g., Wong v. Beckford, 28 App. Div. 2d
137, 283 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't 1967). Additionally, by acknowledging his paternity, the
male becomes severally liable for the support of the out-of-wedlock child. N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 33(5) (McKinney 1964).
178 The rights of a father who can be identified are limited to notice of the proposed
adoption of his illegitimate child, In re Adoption of Anonymous, 78 Misc. 2d 1037, 359
N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1974), and recovery for the wrongful death of the child.
N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTs LAW §§ 5-4.4, -4.5 (McKinney Supp. 1975). He does not qualify
as a statuatory distributee for intestacy purposes. Id. § 4-1.2(b) (McKinney 1967). The rights
of an adjudicated father in regard to intestacy distribution are described in text accompanying note 187 infra.
It may be inferred from the different treatment accorded the unadjudicated father and
natural mother under id. § 4-1.2(b) that different treatment will also be accorded their
spouses in determining their statutory right of election share under id. § 5-1.1 (McKinney
Supp. 1975). This section provides that a spouse's statutory share is
the net estate if the
deceased spouse is survived by no issue, but is reduced to Y if the deceased is survived by
one or more issue. Thus, if the deceased spouse is a woman who has had only an illegitimate
child, her husband's statutory share may be reduced accordingly. In contrast, if a man dies
leaving only an illegitimate child not formally adjudicated as his, his wife's statutory share
would not be affected.
179Proceedings to establish paternity may be instituted by the mother, a person who
stands in a custodial relationship to the child, a representative of a charitable organization,
or, if either the mother or child is in danger of becoming a public charge, by a public welfare
official. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney 1963). This denial of standing to the father
has been questioned. Crane v. Battle, 62 Misc. 2d 137, 307 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County 1970) (father allowed to petition for declaration of paternity). But see Roe v. Roe, 65
Misc. 2d 335, 316 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Family CL Kings County 1970) (court refused to follow
Crane). Recently, the Family Court, Kings County, while not ruling on the constitutionality of
denying a father standing, indicated the statute would probably have to be extended to
fathers in order to be held constitutional. In re Juan R., 174 N.Y.L.J. 83, Oct. 28, 1975, at 9,
col. 4 (Family Ct. Kings County).
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paternal obligation of support. 180 Disparities between the relative
rights of the mother and father, however, remain. 18' While both
acknowledged and adjudicated fathers, like known but unadjudicated fathers, 82 are entitled to notice of a mother's proposed
placement of the child for adoption, 8 3 only her consent is required
for the child's surrender, 84 and she alone has the right to specify
the religious orientation of the adoptive parents. 85 Inequality also
exists between the rights of the mother and the adjudicated father
with respect to the laws of intestate distribution. Although an
illegitimate child may inheritfrom and through his mother, and she
from and through him, 18 6 the illegitimate child may only inherit
from his adjudicated father, and he from his child. 8
Admittedly, many adjudicated fathers fail to assume their pa180At common law, the unacknowledged and unadjudicated father of an illegitimate
child had no obligation to support that child. CLARK, supra note 38, § 5.1, at 155. This
common law rule is now codified at N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 33(5) (McKinney 1964).
Unlike the case where a child is born in wedlock and the father has the primary
obligation of support, see note 45 and accompanying text supra, if a child is born out of
wedlock, the obligation to support may be apportioned between the mother and the father.
See, e.g., id. § 33(5); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 513, 562, 563 (McKinney 1963).
181 Among the disabilities suffered by the adjudicated father is a judicial presumption,
despite clear statutory language to the contrary, that the mother is the best custodian for the
child. Compare Z v. A, 36 App. Div. 2d 995, 320 N.Y.S.2d 997 (3d Dep't 1971) (mem.) and
Norcia v. Richard, 32 App. Div. 2d 656, 300 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dep't 1969), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 26 N.Y.2d 740, 257 N.E.2d 288, 309 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1970)
with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1964) ("no prima facie right to the custody of the
child in either parent").
Once paternity is adjudicated, the father becomes liable for obligations additional to that
of child support if the mother herself is without adequate resources. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMiLY
CT. ACT §§ 514 (expenses of mother's confinement), 536 (mother's counsel fees) (McKinney
1963).182 For a more extensive list, see Comm'n Worksheet, supra note 6, Sec. B.
See note 178 supra.
183 As observed by the court in In re Adoption of Anonymous, 78 Misc. 2d 1037, 359
N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1974),
it is not that the father's "consent" is now necessary as a condition precedent to
adoption, but, rather that he be served with "notice" and given an opportunity to
present facts for the Court's consideration to determine what is "in the best interest
of the child."
Id. at 1039-40, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 223. Accord, In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568,
331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975); Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d
666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1972).
184 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975). The court of appeals recently
upheld the constitutionality of this provision permitting adoption of the child by another
without the natural father's consent. In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331
N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975). In Malpica-Orsini the mother and father had lived
together for two years after the birth of the child and an order of filiation establishing the
father's paternity had been entered. The mother thereafter married another man who filed
a petition for adoption of the child. Following a hearing in which the natural father
appeared and objected to the proposed adoption, the order was entered.
18I N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 373(7)
(McKinney Supp. 1975).
186
N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(1), (b) (McKinney 1967).
187 1Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2), (b).
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ternal responsibilities.18 8 In these cases, the legislature is perhaps
justified in affording the adjudicated father fewer rights than the
natural mother. It should also be recognized that many fathers
assume parental obligations towards an illegitimate child absent an
order of filiation. 8 9 For these reasons it would seem more rational
for the legislature to focus on the concern exhibited by the father,
be he adjudicated or unadjudicated, when determining what rights
he should be granted.' 90
At the outset, a father should be given the right to institute
filiation proceedings. As currently provided, an adjudication of
paternity should carry with it an obligation to support. 19' If in fact
this obligation is fulfilled, the father's rights vis-a-vis his child
should be the same as the mother's. His consent to adoption should
be required, his preference as to the religious orientation of the
adoptive parentsAhould be balanced against the mother's desire,
and his kindred should be able to inherit from the child.
By predicating the rights of the father on his satisfaction of the
parental obligations imposed upon him, the interests of those
fathers who voluntarily assume their parental role or who satisfy
the obligation to support the child would be protected. Their
failure to be adjudicated should not foreclose them from all parental rights. If they have assumed a parental role, in fact, they should
be accorded rights on a parity with those of the mother. Accordingly, the legislature should consider authorizing the family courts
to exercise judicial discretion on a case by case basis in determining
the rights of fathers of illegitimates.1 92 Recent case law suggests
that a weighing of facts and a balancing of equities is not only
feasible but also desirable in those cases where the illegitimate's
father seeks to assert his rights. 193
18 As the court of appeals observed in In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568,
331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), "[t]he vast majority of instances where paternity
has been established arise out of filiation proceedings, compulsory in nature... *."Id. at 573,
331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517. Consequently, many adjudicated fathers, resentful'
of their forced attachment to the child, may be unwilling to assume even the most limited

parental role.
'See,
e.g., Holden v. Alexander, 39 App. Div. 2d 476, 336 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't
1972).
1
"See Foster & Freed, Recent Developments in Family Law -I,

174 N.Y.L.J. 103, Nov.

28, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
19' The obligation to support should be apportioned between the mother and the father
in order to reflect their relative means and capabilities. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
92See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (Supp. 1975), requiring the consent of the
identifiable father of the illegitimate child in order to surrender the child for adoption. The
court is empowered to do away with this requirement, however, if after a hearing it
determines that the consent of the father would not be in the best interests of the child.
193This willingness to look at the individual facts of each case has been exhibited in
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CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the defeat of the ERA, it is submitted that
eradication of sex discrimination from New York's statutory law
continues to be a necessary legislative objective. All New Yorkers
stand to benefit from a comprehensive program of reform. As
outlined above, satisfaction of this objective will result in rational
and equitable laws consistent with modern reality.
Thgr~se M. Haberle
cases involving illegitimates and their fathers seeking to recover for each other's wrongful
death. See, e.g., Holden v. Alexander, 39 App. Div. 2d 476, 336 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't
1972); In~re Estate of Johnson, 75 Misc. 2d 502, 348 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County
1973). Similarly, courts have scrutinized the conduct of the illegitimate's father in determining whether he should be accorded visitation rights. See, e.g., Pierce v. Yerkovitch, 80 Misc.
2d 613, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Family Ct. Ulster County 1974). And, when the illegitimate's
father exercises his right to a hearing prior to the termination of the parental relationship
attendant to adoption, the courts carefully weigh the indicia of parental interest previously
exhibited. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 586, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370
N.Y.S.2d 571 (1975); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 78 Misc. 2d 1037, 359 N.Y.S.2d 220
(Sur. Ct. Erie County 1974).

